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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to examine the positive and negative impacts of stock
exchange mergers on the informational efficiency of the markets. We consider
a range of factors in relation to the stock exchange merger, that can potentially
affects market efficiency, after a merger. These factors include the maturity of the
markets being merged, the size of the markets, and different types of mergers (de-
veloped markets versus developing markets; large stock exchange mergers ver-
sus small stock exchange mergers; and domestic stock exchange mergers versus
cross-border stock exchange mergers). For this purpose, we use a time-varying
return predictability test which allows us to detect periods of (in)efficiency, and
thus to conduct a comparative analysis for pre-merger and post-merger periods.
We find that increases in efficiency are less frequent than decreases in efficiency
after a stock exchange merger. Finally, we provide the empirical evidence that
the impact on efficiency depends on range of the characteristics of the merger:
stock exchange’s country’s level of development, size, geographical diversifica-
tion and industrial diversification.
Keywords: Stock exchange mergers; Market efficiency; Martingale difference
sequence.
JEL Classification: C12; C14; G14; G15.
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1 Introduction
On February 2011, the NYSE Euronext Inc. and Deutsche Börse AG announced their
intentions to merge. This deal would have created the world’s largest stock exchange
operator. Despite a competing hostile bid made by the NASDAQ and InterContinental
Exchange in April 2011, the offer was approved by the shareholders of both firms
in July 2011. In December 2011, the U.S. Justice Department blessed the tie-up of
the NYSE Euronext and Deutsche Börse on the condition that the German exchange
operators agreed to sell its 31.5% stake in Direct Edge Holdings LLC. However, in
early February 2012, the European Commission decided to block the deal under the
pretence that this merger would have led to create a near monopoly on the international
market of European derivatives. As expected, NYSE Euronext Chairman, Jan-Michiel
Hessels regretted that decision: “Our merger would have created a high standard for
transparency, stability and efficiency in the global capital markets, and we proposed
significant and tangible remedies designed to address the European Commission’s
concerns with the transaction” (Business Wire, 2012).
Since the end of the 1990s, a number of stock exchanges have merged following
the trend toward demutualization of the stock exchanges – the process of converting
exchanges from nonprofit, member-owned organizations to for-profit, investor-owned
corporations – which started in the early 1990s (Aggarwal, 2002; Aggarwal and
Dahiya, 2006).1 This process of demutualization has made securities trading more
competitive.2 These mergers can be viewed as the manifestation of consolidation of
exchanges both geographically and across products.
It is believed that stock exchange mergers have strong positive effects such as
increased liquidity, market shares or efficiency; or potentially negative consequences
including increased fees or lowered quality of service. According to Pagano and
1For a discussion of the demutualization process see Aggarwal (2002).
2Aggarwal and Dahiya (2006) give four factors driving the demutualization of stock exchanges: (i)
deregulation of trading exchanges, (ii) growing conflicts of interest between existing owners, (iii) new
developments in information technology and the rise of electronic communication networks (ECNs) or
alternative trading system (ATSs), and (iv) shifting regulatory landscape.
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Padilla (2005), integration of stock exchanges produces a number of significant direct
and indirect efficiency gains. In their empirical study, Pagano and Padilla (2005)
examine Euronext, created in 2000, from the merger between the French, Dutch,
Portuguese and Belgian stock exchanges. In particular, they show that (1) the average
trading fees have significantly decreased in Paris and Amsterdam, (2) the bid-ask
spreads of the securities for main indices fell in Paris, Brussels and Amsterdam, (3)
the trading volume increased in Paris, Brussels and Amsterdam, and (4) the volatility
of the large-cap securities traded in Paris, Brussels, Amsterdam and Lisbon fell after
the merger. These results strongly suggest that the possibility that market efficiency
improves after stock exchange mergers, although Pagano and Padilla (2005) does not
test this hypothesis directly. Implicitly, the results of Pagano and Padilla (2005) seem
to indicate that stock exchange mergers do not affect all merging stock markets in the
same way: for example, the beneficial impacts of the merger seem to be weaker in
Portugal stock exchange than in the others. On the other hand, it is possible that stock
exchange mergers lead to negative impacts. For example, elimination of a competitor
might have a dramatic impact on competition in this industry, and the stock exchange
company might try to take advantage from this increased market power to increase
fees or to lower quality of service which could reduce efficiency after the merger3.
Given this, it is of interest to test whether the market efficiency improves after a stock
exchange merger, paying attention to the question of “in which cases does efficiency
increase after a stock exchange merger?”
The efficient market hypothesis (EMH) of Samuelson (1965) and Fama (1965)
states that asset prices fully and instantaneously reflect all available and relevant
information. Since price adjustment to a new piece of information is instantaneous
and accurate, the returns cannot be predicted. As a result, prices in an efficient market
follow a random walk or a martingale process.4 Under the weak-form efficiency where
the information set consists of past prices and returns, future prices and their returns are
purely unpredictable based on past price information. Most of the studies for the EMH
3see, for example, Kim and Singal (1993)
4See Escanciano and Lobato (2009b) for a distinction between random walk and martingale process.
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on financial markets have tested whether the returns follow a martingale difference
sequence (MDS), where the returns are uncorrelated with the past values.
This paper is a step forward in the understanding of stock exchange mergers. We
examine the positive and negative impacts of stock exchange mergers on the infor-
mational efficiency of the markets. We consider a range of factors in relation to the
stock exchange merger, that can potentially affect market efficiency, after a merger, by
studying the impacts of 31 mergers on the efficiency of 37 stock exchanges. These
factors include the maturity of the markets being merged, the size of the markets,
and different types of mergers (developed markets versus mergers under-developed
markets; large stock exchange mergers versus small stock exchange mergers; and do-
mestic stock exchange mergers versus cross-border stock exchange mergers). For this
purpose, we evaluate time-varying return predictability using the generalized spectral
shape test of Escansiano and Velasco (2006) for the martingale difference hypothesis
(MDH). We use moving sub-sample window of 3 months, which allows us to detect
periods of (in)efficiency, and thus to conduct a comparative analysis for pre-merger
and post-merger periods. Furthermore, to analyze the evolution of the merger effect
across the time, we take different lengths of subperiods, i.e. one month, three months,
six months, nine months, and twelve months.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a brief
review on the effects of stock exchange mergers. Section 3 suggests some hypotheses
linked with the effect of mergers on the efficiency. The MDS test of Escansiano and
Velasco (2006) is presented in Section 4. The empirical results are discussed in Sec-
tion 5, and Section 6 concludes.
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2 Effects of stock exchange mergers: A brief review
This section provides a brief review of the effects of the stock exchange mergers.
Overall, while it is largely expected that stock exchange mergers bring economic gains,
it is also possible that they bring negative impacts.
First, it is believed that a merger between two stock exchanges can increase
liquidity of the stock traded on that stock market. As explained by Nielsson (2009), if
trading volume of a particular stock is low, then, the bid-ask spread is typically high
which makes the stock less liquid. Following a stock exchange merger, the potential
investor base may increase, and the order book may fill and the transaction cost may
be reduced.
Second, the gains from merger can come from the economies of scale (the
combined firm can produce more of a same product or service at a lower cost than
two separate firms can) and from the economies of scope (the combined firm can
produce more of different products or services at a lower cost than two separate firms
can). Economies of scale may be achieved when two domestic exchanges merge;
while economies of scope may be achieved when a stock exchange merges with a
commodity exchange. Kokkoris and Olivares-Caminal (2008) explain that merger of
financial markets in Europe will benefit the corporate sector since it will lower trading
costs due to positive economies of scale and synergy effects.
Third, horizontal integration can attract market shares (share of trading);5 while
vertical integration (acquisitions of brokers, acquisition of providers of electronic
trading services, . . . ), on the other hand, could increase the margins of the stock
exchanges resulting in a reduction of the trading costs.6
Conversely, according to the market power theory, the merged stock exchange
5For example, in a study based on 3 US regional stock exchange mergers, Arnold et al. (1999) show
that stock exchange consolidation provide narrower bid-ask spreads and attract market share from other
exchanges.
6For example, Goldberg et al. (2002) explain how the consolidation of stock exchanges and clearing
or settlement agencies in Europe could allow to increase stock liquidity and decrease fees charged by
stock exchanges.
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may try to exploit monopolistic rents by increasing the trading fees which would
increase the transaction costs and thus stock’s illiquidity. As such, Nielsson (2009)
recognizes that firms may experience a lower stock liquidity after a stock exchange
merger, in particular as a result of a potential monopolistic behavior by the newly
merged exchange. The regulators are fairly vigilant in making sure that the deal will
not have significant adverse effect on the industry’s competition and rule against those
deals.
Unfortunately, the actual impact of stock exchange mergers are largely unknown,
as there are very few theoretical or empirical studies analyzing their impact. One of
a few studies is Nielsson (2009), who studies how Euronext stock exchange merger
impacts stock liquidity of listed firms. He finds that the main beneficiaries are big
firms with foreign sales but observes no systematic pattern in the distribution of merger
benefits across industries or listing locations. This may due to the fact that following
the merger, stocks traded on a national stock exchange becomes more accessible to
foreign investors. More visible firms (large firms and those which operate abroad)
may be thus more attractive for foreign investors. In any case, no clear evidence is
found for the firms that suffered from a decreased liquidity. Moreover, according to
Nielsson (2009), Euronext stock exchange merger increases Euronext’s market share
at the expense of the London Stock Exchange, but no evidence of Euronext enhancing
its competitive stand in terms of attracting new firm listings is found. In a related paper,
Arnold et al. (1999) showed that merging stock exchanges increase market share and
provide narrower bid ask spreads. Finally, Khan and Vieito (2012) investigate the
impact of the merger between the Portuguese Stock exchange and Euronext in 2002 on
informational market efficiency. Their results show a mixed evidence of improvement
in market efficiency during the post-merger period.
3 Hypotheses development
We only focus on the mergers by stock exchanges where the bidders acquire 100%
of the target’s shares. This allows us to focus on the effect of an unexpected stock
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exchange’s merger on the efficiency of the stocks traded on this market. It is well-
known that a prior ownership (a toehold) increases the bidder’s probability of a
successful full acquisition (see, for example, Goldman and Qian, 2005). Therefore,
if a stock exchange already owns a stake in another stock exchange, the likelihood
of a successful acquisition will be higher. Thus, the stock market response to the
announcement of an acquisition might be different depending on whether the stock
exchange has established a prior ownership or not and on the size of this toehold.
Indeed it is possible that the pre-merger efficiency of a stock exchange be impacted by
this ownership if stock exchange mergers have an impact on efficiency. For example,
if stock exchange mergers have a positive impact on efficiency, the fact that a merger
is more likely to occur may influence investors’ behaviors because the stocks traded
on this stock exchange would be more attractive which can increase the efficiency. To
avoid this bias in the calculation of the pre-merger efficiency, it might be better to focus
on unexpected mergers, that is mergers without prior ownership by the bidder. Our
final sample is made of 31 mergers where the bidder or the target is a stock exchange
which merged either with another stock exchange, a commodity exchange or a services
provider. In a domestic merger, the bidder and the target come from the same country.
Therefore, in a domestic merger, only the stocks listed in this country may be impacted
by the merger. In a cross-border merger, the bidder and the target come from different
countries. In that case, the merger could impact the efficiency of the stocks listed in the
target’s and in the bidder’s home countries. Thus, we have studied the impact of our
31 mergers on the efficiency of 37 stock exchanges. Further details of theses mergers
are listed in Table 11 to 13 of the paper.
In this section, we formulate a number of hypotheses to be empirically tested in
this paper. We consider a range of factors in relation to the stock exchange merger,
that can potentially affect market efficiency, after a merger. These factors include the
maturity of the markets being merged, the size of the markets, and different types of
mergers.
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3.1 Stock exchange mergers in developed countries versus those in
developing countries
The conventional wisdom is that emerging markets are less efficient than developed
markets (Griffin et al. 2010). If so, one might assume that the potential for improving
the efficiency is greater for stock exchange mergers in developing than in developed
ones. However, while Griffin et al. (2007) report no evidence that better country-level
legal, regulatory, and governance characteristics are positively related to higher lev-
els of market efficiency, Shamsuddin and Kim (2010) find the degree of efficiency of
stock markets is negatively correlated with equity market development. Given these
contrasting results, it is of interest to test whether stock exchange merger impacts dif-
ferently on the efficiency of the markets developing and developed countries. Based
on this, the first hypothesis of interest is:
Hypothesis 1: stock exchange mergers have the same impact on the efficiency of the
markets of developing and developed countries.
Under Hypothesis 1, the frequencies of improved efficiency of the markets of
developing and developed countries should be statistically no different. In the
empirical analysis presented in Section 5, we classify the countries into developing and
developed ones, following the definitions of the World Economic Forum (see WEF,
2012).
3.2 Stock exchange size
Ben Slimane (2010) studied the creation of Euronext and observed a beneficial impact
of the merger on stock volatility only for the Portuguese market. She explains that this
may be due to its lower size and level of development. This may suggest that the size
of stock exchange impact stock exchange merger outcomes. Therefore, it is possible
that increase in the degree of market efficiency is higher for the merger between small
stock exchanges, since the potential for improvement is greater in this case. On the
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other hand, the impact of a small stock exchange merger may be too small to signif-
icantly increase the efficiency. Whether increases in the efficiency are higher in the
merger of small stock exchanges than in the merger of large ones is an empirical issue,
and the following hypothesis of interest can be formulated:
Hypothesis 2: The size of stock exchanges plays no role in the improvement of the de-
gree of market efficiency, after the merger.
Under Hypothesis 2, the frequencies of the improved market efficiency should be
statistically no different between the mergers of the small exchanges and large ones.
3.3 Domestic pure stock exchange mergers
To shed further light on the impact of stock exchange mergers on the efficiency, we
compared domestic pure stock exchange mergers to other kind of mergers. We define
a pure stock exchange merger as a merger between two stock exchanges (in contrast to
a merger between a stock exchange and a commodity exchange or a services provider).
Domestic pure stock exchanges mergers should (1) simplify trading, (2) increase liq-
uidity and (3) consolidate the offer of domestic securities. The improved international
reputation and the easier access to information may attract some institutional and for-
eign investors, with a potential to lure more companies into going public. In that case,
higher trading volume will drive down the trading fees and thus, will increase the ef-
ficiency of the stocks traded on this exchange. By contrast, it is also possible that the
stock exchange companies use their increased market power after a merger to raise
trading fees which would decrease the efficiency of the stocks traded on this exchange.
Thus, whether domestic pure stock exchanges mergers increase or decrease efficiency
is an empirical issue:
Hypothesis 3: A domestic pure stock exchange merger brings no gain in market effi-
ciency
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3.4 Domestic pure stock exchange mergers versus cross-border pure
stock exchanges mergers
Technological breakthroughs, such as computerized trading, which has lowered fees
per trade, have made cross border trading easier and thus have created an international
competition between stock exchanges to dominate trading globally. Consistent with
this view, Kokkoris and Olivares-Caminal (2008) argue that cross-border pure stock
exchange mergers aim at exploiting economies of scale in trading. Moreover, cross-
border pure stock exchanges mergers may be a way for the stock market to improve
its standing as a regional financial center. On the other hand, increase in market effi-
ciency may be harder or longer to achieve in cross-border pure stock exchange mergers
than in domestic pure stock exchange mergers, because of differences in taxation treat-
ments and in regulations in each country. For example, the three-way merger between
the Peruvian, Colombian and Chilean stock exchanges has been disrupted by the exis-
tence of different tax rates on their profits in each country, which has slowed down the
integration process. Thus, whether cross-border stock exchanges mergers increase or
decrease efficiency is an empirical issue:
Hypothesis 4a: A cross-border stock exchange merger has no impact on market effi-
ciency.
Under the alternative to Hypothesis 4a, efficiency will increase after a cross-border
stock exchange merger due to economies of scale in trading.
Hypothesis 4b: A cross-border stock exchange merger and a domestic stock exchange
merger have the same impact on the market efficiency.
Under the alternative to Hypothesis 4b, increases in efficiency are more frequent
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after a domestic stock exchange merger than after a cross-border stock exchange
merger due to difficulties in the integration process (for example in the standardiza-
tion of the exchange rules).
By nature, in a cross-border merger, the target firm and the bidding firm come from
different countries. However, differences in stock market development (in size or liq-
uidity for example) as well as in corporate governance may have an impact on stock
market efficiency. If the bidder is characterized by a better stock market development
and/or a better corporate governance, the potential for efficiency improvement may be
larger for the target than for the bidder. Conversely, the target stock exchange may be
acquired by the bidder stock exchange precisely because this acquisition will increase
the efficiency of the stocks listed on the bidder stock exchange. Therefore, the merger
may have a different impact on the efficiency of the stocks listed on the target’s stock
exchange and on the bidder’s stock exchange. Thus, whether cross-border stock ex-
changes mergers impact both target and acquirer efficiency is an empirical issue:
Hypothesis 5: Neither targets nor bidders will experience a significant increase in the
efficiency after a cross border stock exchange merger.
When the Hypothesis 5 is rejected, there are three possible outcomes:
• Both targets and bidders will experience a significant increase in the efficiency,
after a cross border stock exchange merger.
• Only targets will experience a significant increase in the efficiency, after a cross
border stock exchange merger.
• Only bidders will experience a significant increase in the efficiency, after a cross
border stock exchange merger.
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3.5 Domestic pure stock exchange mergers versus domestic diversifying
stock exchange mergers
A large number of theoretical works has been undertaken concerning whether or not
diversifying mergers are in the best interests of the shareholders. According to Denis,
Denis and Sarin (1997) diversification costs outweigh the benefits. Indeed, it is of-
ten difficult to produce efficiency gains when the target and the bidder do not belong
to the same industry. On the contrary, Kokkoris and Olivares-Caminal (2008) argue
that mergers combining different activities (for example, a merger between a broker
or a services provider and a stock exchange) seek to provide a more comprehensive
financial service to customers which could improve efficiency. Thus, whether domes-
tic diversifying stock exchange mergers increase or decrease efficiency is an empirical
issue:
Hypothesis 6a: Efficiency will increase after a diversifying stock exchange merger due
to the creation of a more comprehensive financial service to customers.
Hypothesis 6b: Increase in efficiency is higher after a domestic stock exchange merger
than after a diversifying stock exchange merger due to diversification costs.
4 Tests for Return Predictability
In this section, we present a statistical test for stock return predictability capable of
detecting both linear and nonlinear dependence present in financial time series (Lim
and Brooks, 2006; Lim, 2007; Lim et al., 2008), namely the generalized spectral
shape (GSS) test of Escansiano and Velasco (2006). The GSS test is a generalized ver-
sion of the spectral shape test of Durlauf (1991), constructed based on the observation
that the spectral density of a martingale difference sequence (MDS) is flat. The test
is capable of detecting both linear and nonlinear dependence structures. In a recent
Monte Carlo study, Charles et al. (2011) found that this test shows desirable size and
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power properties in small samples, under a wide range of martingale processes and
non-martingale alternatives.7
The null hypothesis of interest is H0 : E(Yt |Yt−1,Yt−2, ...) = µ, where µ is a real
number. Escanciano and Velasco (2006) express the above null hypothesis in a form
of pairwise regression function. That is,H0 :m j(y) = 0, wherem j(y) =E(Yt−µ|Yt− j =
y), against H1 : P[m j(y) 6= 0]> 0 for some j. They note that the above null hypothesis
is equivalent to the following condition:
γ j(x)≡ E[(Yt −µ)eixYt− j ] = 0,
where γ j(x) represents an autocovariance measure in a non-linear framework and x
represents any real number. Escanciano and Velasco (2006) propose the use of the
generalized spectral distribution function, whose sample estimate is written as
Ĥ = γ̂0(x)λ+2
∞
∑
j=1
(1− j
T
)̂γ j(x)
sin( jpiλ)
jpi
,
where γ̂ j(x) = (T − j)−1 ∑Tt=1+ j(Yt −Y T− j)eixYt− j and Y T− j = (T − j)−1∑Tt=1+ jYt .
Under the null hypothesis, the above generalized spectral distribution function has
the value Ĥ0(λ,x) = γ̂0(x)λ, and the test statistic for H0 is constructed as
ST (λ,x) = (0.5T )
1/2{Ĥ(λ,x)− Ĥ0(λ,x)}
=
T−1
∑
j=1
(T − j)0.5γ̂ j(x)
√
2sin( jpix)
jpi
.
To evaluate the value of ST for all possible values of λ and x, Escanciano and
Velasco (2006) use the Cramer-von Mises norm to obtain the statistic of the form
D2T =
T−1
∑
j=1
(T − j)
( jpi)2
T
∑
t= j+1
T
∑
s= j+1
exp(−0.5(Yt− j−Ys− j)2). (1)
7Khan and Vieto (2012) study the impact of Euronext stock exchange consolidation on market
efficiency, and perform numerous statistical tests: serial correlation test, runs test, multiple variance
ratio test of Chow and Denning (1993) and ranks and signs test of Wright (2000).
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Escanciano and Velasco (Theorem 2, 2006) show that the test statistic D2T is
consistent against all pairwise alternatives to the null hypothesis, and asymptotically
follows a weighted sum of independent chi-squared distributions. To implement the
test in small samples, Escanciano and Velasco (2006) propose the use of the wild
bootstrap which is conducted in three stages as follows:
1. Form a bootstrap sample of size T asY ∗t =ηtYt (t = 1, ...,T ), where ηt is random
variable with zero mean and unit variance;
2. Calculate D2∗T , the D
2∗
T statistic calculated from {Y ∗t }Tt=1;
3. Repeat 1 and 2 B times, to produce the bootstrap distribution of the GSS statistic
{D2∗T ( j)}Bj=1.
The test for H0 against the two-tailed alternative can be conducted using the p-
value, which is estimated as the proportion of the absolute values of {D2∗T ( j)}Bj=1
greater than the absolute value of the observed statistic D2∗T . For ηt , we use the two
point distribution given in Escanciano and Velasco (2006; p.164).
5 Empirical results
5.1 Data
We use daily closing spot prices from the following stock exchange markets:
Amsterdam Stock Exchange (AEX), Athens Stock Exchange (ATHEX), Australian
Stock Exchange (ASX), Bolsa de Valores de Colombia (BVC), Bolsa de Valores
de Lima (BVL), Bolsa de Santiago de Chile (BSC), Borsa Italiana, Dubai Financial
Market (DFM), Euronext, Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE), Kuala Lumpur Stock
Exchange (KLSE), Lisbon Stock Exchange, London Stock Exchange (LSE), Moscow
Interbank Currency Exchange (MICEX), New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), Paris
Stock Exchange, Sao Paulo Stock Exchange (SAO), Stock Exchange of Hong Kong
(SEHK), Stock Exchange of Singapore, Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE), Toronto Stock
Exchange (TSX), and Zagreb Stock Exchange (ZSE). The fill list of the stock
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exchanges considered and the indices used are given in Table ??. The data are obtained
from Thomson Financial Datastream. Throughout the study, returns are calculated as:
Rt ≡ (Pt −Pt−1)/Pt−1×100
with Rt the return at day t, and Pt the index level at day t.
For each merger, the data cover the period of 15 months before and after the date of
merger. The dates of merger are given in Tables 11-13 ("Date effective"). We employ
fixed-length moving sub-sample window of 3 months, which consists of around 66
daily observations, before and after the date of merger. This sample size allows us to
analyze the effect of the merger on the short term, and also to have relatively good
performance for the GSS test.
5.2 Details of testing procedure
The empirical analysis in this paper computes the GSS test statistic in a rolling
window framework to detect the evolving nature of linear and nonlinear predictability,
respectively, and hence changing degree of market efficiency over time. We evaluate
time-varying return predictability by applying the GSS test with 3-months fixed-length
moving sub-sample windows. For the post-merger (pre-merger) period, the first sub-
sample window covers the period from the date of merger to three months after
(before). After the GSS test is conducted for the first sub-sample, the window is moved
one daily observations forward (backward), and the test statistic is recalculated. This
process continues to the end of the data points. Given that the rolling window approach
is able to detect periods of (in)efficiency, the relative efficiency of stock markets can
be assessed by comparing the total time periods these markets exhibit significant linear
or nonlinear serial dependence over time(see Lim, 2007; Lim and Brooks, 2006; Lim
et al., 2008).
We also conduct a comparative analysis for pre-merger and post-merger sub-
periods with an equal number of observations. To analyze the evolution of the merger
effect across the time, we take different lengths of subperiods, i.e. one month, three
months, six months, nine months, and twelve months. For each sub-period, we
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compute the proportions of the p-values less than 0.05 (p) and the mean of the p-
values (m). Let p1 and p2 represent the sample proportion estimate of the p-values less
than 0.05 for pre- and post-merger sub-periods, respectively; and m1 and m2 represent
the sample mean estimate of the p-values for pre- and post-merger sub-periods,
respectively. We can test individually H0p1 : p1 = 0.05 against H1p1 : p1 > 0.05 and
H0p2 : p2 = 0.05 against H1p2 : p2 > 0.05. Rejection of H0p1 in favor of H1p1 is
evidence against the MDH for the pre-merger period, and rejection of H0p2 in favor of
H1p2 is evidence against the MDH for the post-merger period. Since the samples are
overlapped because of using rolling windows, the statistical significance of the tests in
successive sub-periods are tested from the nonparametric McNemar test. We can also
test the null hypothesis that the two population proportions and means are equal, i.e
H0p : p1− p2 = 0 and H0m : m1−m2 = 0, respectively. The alternative hypothesis is
H1p : p1− p2 < 0 (or H∗1p : p1− p2 > 0) for the proportions and H1m : m1−m2 < 0 or
H∗1m :m1−m2 > 0). To test for these hypotheses, we use the nonparametric McNemar
test for the proportion comparison, and the nonparametric Wilcoxon test for the mean
comparison.
Given the information above, we apply the following testing strategies:
Step 1: Individual proportion tests
– If H0p1 and H0p2 are not rejected, then the MDH is accepted for the pre-
and post-merger periods;
– If H0p1 is not rejected and H0p2 is rejected, then the MDH is accepted for
the pre-merger period but rejected for the post-merger period;
– If H0p1 is rejected and H0p2 is not rejected, then the MDH is accepted for
the post-merger period but rejected for the pre-merger period;
– If H0p1 and H0p2 are rejected, the MDH is rejected for the pre- and post-
merger periods, and we go to step 2.
Step 2: Proportion comparison test
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– If H0p is rejected against H1p (p1 − p2 < 0), then both sub-periods are
inefficient and the pre-merger period is less inefficient than the post-merger
period. Therefore, the merger can imply a loss of efficiency;
– If H0p is rejected against H∗1p (p1 − p2 > 0), then both sub-periods are
inefficient and the pre-merger period is more inefficient than the post-
merger period. Therefore, the merger can imply a gain of efficiency;
– If H0p is not rejected (p1− p2 = 0), then both sub-periods are efficient, and
we go to step 3.
Step 3: Mean comparison test
– If H0m is rejected against H1m (m1−m2 < 0), then the pre-merger period is
less efficient than the post-merger period. Therefore, the merger can imply
a gain of efficiency;
– If H0m is rejected against H∗1m (m1−m2 > 0), then the pre-merger period
is more efficient than the post-merger period. Therefore, the merger can
imply a loss of efficiency.
5.3 Results
We study the impact of 31 mergers on the efficiency of 37 stock exchanges. Tables
??–?? display the mergers between stock exchanges, between a stock exchange and
a provider of services, and between a stock exchange and a commodity exchange,
respectively. We give both the announced and effective dates of each merger, and the
name, the country and the industry of the target and the acquiror.
5.3.1 General analysis
The overall analysis of the results reveals some interesting findings. Firstly, the GSS
test shows, in most of our observations, a significant evolution of the efficiency of
the stock prices (Table ??). According to the GSS test, in only 29.07% of our 172
observations, the stock market has experienced no significant changes in efficiency
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after a stock exchange merger. This means that in most of the cases, a stock exchange
merger has a significant impact on the efficiency. Secondly, taken globally, the results
indicates that, following a stock exchange mergers, decreases in the efficiency (41.28%
of the cases) are more common than increases in the efficiency (29.65% of the cases).
Therefore these results cast doubt on the supposed benefits of stock exchange mergers
on the efficiency, and tend to be fairly consistent with the market power theory. Thirdly,
the results are conditional on the length of the subperiods since we observe a decrease
in the frequency of efficiency improvements after a stock exchange merger in the long
term.
5.3.2 Stock exchange mergers in developed countries versus stock exchange
mergers in developing countries
As mentiobed before, we follow the definitions of the World Economic Forum to
classify the countries into developed and developing ones. This allowed us to construct
a subsample of 10 deals where a developing country’s stock exchange merged with
another firm (another stock/commodity exchange or a provider of services) and a
subsample of 27 deals where a developed country’s stock exchange merges with
another firm. Table ?? shows that in developing countries, even if the stock market
may be more efficient in the short term after a stock exchange merger with another
firm, it is undoubtedly significantly less efficient in the long term.
Increases in the efficiency of stock markets are more frequently observed after a
stock exchange merger in a developing country than in developed countries only in the
very short term, namely less than 1 month (Table ??). In all the other cases, increases
in the efficiency of stock markets are more prevalent in developed countries than in
developing countries.
To sum up, our results indicate the overall rejection of Hypothesis 1 that stock
exchange mergers have the same impact on the efficiency of the markets in developing
and developed countries. The evidence show that, in the medium and long terms, the
impact of stock exchange mergers results more frequently in efficiency improvements
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in developed countries than in developing countries; while the reverse is the case in
the very short term.
5.3.3 Stock exchange size
We collected information concerning the size of the merger on Thompson One Banker
Database. We focus only on domestic mergers and obtained information concerning
16 deals. We split our sample in two so that we had 8 small mergers (average size of
$26.57 million with a minimum size of $5.37 million and a maximum size of $121
million) and 8 large mergers (average size of $934.88 with a minimum size of $140
million and a maximum size of $2,259.09 million). The results of Table ?? display
that small deals resulting in significantly less efficient stock market after the merger.
This is particularly true in the long term since no small merger improved efficiency for
a subperiod of more than 9 months.
The comparison of small mergers results with those obtained for large mergers
offers some very interesting insights (Tables ?? and ??). Especially, large mergers tend
to result in the increase of efficiency in long term with high frequency. Our evidence
shows strong evidence against Hypothesis 2 that the size of stock exchanges play no
role in the improvement of market efficiency after the merger. We find that small stock
exchange mergers may be too small to significantly increase the efficiency; while large
stock exchange mergers show strong tendency to increase the efficiency.
5.3.4 Domestic pure stock exchange mergers
In order to test Hypotheses 3, we focused on the 11 domestic pure stock exchange
mergers of our sample (Table ??). The results show that the stock market is
significantly less efficient after the merger than before. These results are particularly
meaningful in the debate over the impact of stock exchange mergers. Whereas the
results are mixed in the very short term (as many deals result in efficiency increase
than in efficiency decrease one month after the merger), in the medium to long term, the
results clearly show a decrease in the efficiency after the merger. Therefore, domestic
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mergers between two stock exchanges tend to have a negative impact on efficiency,
which is the evidence against Hypothesis 3.
5.3.5 Domestic pure stock exchange mergers versus cross border pure stock
exchange mergers
To test Hypotheses 4a and 4b, we focused on the six cross border stock exchange
mergers of our sample. The results of Table ?? seem to indicate that the efficiency
of stocks listed on a stock exchange will decrease after a cross-border stock exchange
merger which invalidates Hypothesis 4a. The comparison with the results given in
Table ?? indicates that for most length of subperiods, cross-border pure stock exchange
mergers result more frequently in an efficiency decrease than domestic pure stock
exchange mergers which contradicts Hypothesis 4b.
We have then split our sample between targets and bidders of a cross border stock
exchange merger in order to study whether there are differences in the changes of the
efficiency of their stocks. The results given in Tables ?? and ?? tend to invalidate
Hypothesis 5. Even if the number of observations is quite low, our evidence tends
to indicate that, on the long term, both target’s and bidder’s stocks seem to be less
efficient after than before a cross border stock exchange.
This result is very interesting from a theoretical and policy point of view, because
it calls into question the justification of cross-border stock exchange mergers since
neither the acquirer nor the target seem to benefit from this kind of mergers in term of
efficiency. Conversely, both stock exchanges suffer from a decrease in the efficiency.
5.3.6 Domestic pure stock exchange mergers versus domestic diversifying stock
exchange mergers
Finally, we studied the impact of diversifying stock exchange mergers on efficiency
(Table ??). The results are somewhat mixed. In the short to medium term, they tend
to indicate an increase in the efficiency; whereas, in the long term, the results tend to
indicate a decrease in the efficiency after a diversifying stock exchange merger. Thus,
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Hypothesis 6a is validated in the short term but not in the long term.
The comparison between domestic focusing and domestic diversifying stock exchange
mergers (Tables 6 and 10) seems to indicate that stock exchange’s diversification might
be useful to increase efficiency since efficiency improvements are more frequent after
a diversifying merger than after a focusing merger. This invalidates Hypothesis 6b.
6 Conclusion
The aim of this paper is to examine the impact of stock exchange mergers on
informational efficiency of the markets. Indeed, there is currently an important debate
among practitioners; among scholars; and between advocates and opponents of stock
exchange mergers. Proponents of stock exchange mergers argue that integration of
stock exchanges produces a number of significant direct and indirect efficiency gains
such as decreases in the trading fees, in the bid-ask and the volatility of the securities as
well as increases in the trading volumes (see for example Pagano and Padilla, 2005).
By contrast, critics of stock exchange mergers generally refer to the market power
theory to emphasize that the merged stock exchanges may try to exploit monopolistic
rents by increasing the trading fees which would increase the transaction costs and thus
stock’s illiquidity. Therefore, according to the point of view, stock exchange mergers
may have a positive or a negative impact on efficiency.
Despite the importance of the issue, there are very few studies analyzing the impact
of stock exchanges mergers on efficiency. In this paper, we have studied the impact of
31 mergers on the efficiency of 37 stock exchanges in order to fill this gap. Our results
should be of interest not only to practitioners and scholars; but also to policymakers,
because the approach used allowed us to compare different types of mergers and to
study in which cases efficiency increases (or decreases) after a stock exchange merger.
Firstly, we show that stock exchange mergers do have an impact on market
efficiency. Taken together, our results indicate a significant change in efficiency
after a stock exchange merger in almost 71% of our 172 observations. Secondly,
and more importantly, we show that there may be a ground for the concerns of the
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critics of stock exchange mergers. Indeed, in our full sample and in most of our
sub-samples (domestic pure stock exchange mergers, cross border stock exchange
mergers, domestic diversifying stock exchange mergers), increases in efficiency are
less frequent than decreases in efficiency after a stock exchange merger. This result is
in contrast with that of Khan and Vieto (2012); and raises the question in relation to the
motives underlying stock exchange mergers. It also encourages supervisory authorities
to carefully evaluate the impact of these mergers. Thirdly, we show that the positive
impact of stock exchange mergers on efficiency tends to decline over time. That is,
the positive impact of a stock exchange merger is more frequent in the short term than
in the long term. This effect has to be considered by those who would measure the
impact of a stock exchange merger and incites to use different lengths of subperiods.
Finally, we show that the impact on efficiency depends on range of the characteristics
of the merger: stock exchange’s country’s level of development, size, geographical
diversification and industrial diversification.
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